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Why the Religious Right Can’t Have Its
(Straight Wedding) Cake and Eat It Too:
Breaking the Preservation-ThroughTransformation Dynamic in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission
Kyle C. Velte†
Introduction
In the 2017 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the
most significant LGBT-rights case since its 2015 marriage equality
decision:1
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission.2 The case presents a question—what I call the
Antidiscrimination Question3—that has been percolating through
lower courts for nearly a decade: may small business owners, such
as photographers, bakers, and florists, be exempt from state
antidiscrimination laws based on their religious beliefs about samesex marriage?4 The Religious Right5 has been squarely behind this
† Visiting Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. I offer
my thanks to Catherine Christopher, Lauren Fontana, and Jana Hunter for their
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts and to Texas Tech University School of
Law for its support of this project.
1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
3. See Kyle C. Velte, All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the
Religious Right’s Challenge to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016)
for an overview of the Anti-Discrimination question and the history of religious
organizations’ litigation using this concept.
4. The specific question presented in Masterpiece is whether Colorado’s public
accommodation law violates the First Amendment as applied to a baker who refused
to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple based on the baker’s religious belief that
marriage is only between one man and one woman. See QUESTION PRESENTED:
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP (2017), U.S. SUPREME COURT, https://www.supreme
court.gov/qp/16-00111qp.pdf (last accessed Nov. 8, 2017). Other Antidiscrimination
Question cases present the same question vis-à-vis a state’s Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). See, e.g., Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–
59 (N.M. 2013).
5. The Religious Right is a leading voice of the anti-LGBT rights movement in
the United States. It is an alliance of evangelical Protestant Christians and
American Roman Catholics, whose goal is to stop and reverse these civil rights
victories. I use this phrase as an umbrella term to describe organizations such as
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effort to carve out religious exemptions for secular businesses from
generally applicable antidiscrimination laws.6
The Antidiscrimination Question is as significant as the
marriage equality question. It may have more significance due to
the sweeping scope of what the Religious Right seeks: the creation
of quasi-theocratic zones of exemption, disguised in the seemingly
neutral concept of “religious liberty,” in which Christian business
owners may pick which laws to follow.7 A decision that the First
Amendment trumps antidiscrimination laws when applied to
secular businesses discriminating against LGBT couples would
have a wide-reaching and devastating impact on the LGBT
community, ushering in an era of the Gay Jim Crow.
I have previously addressed the legal and policy axes of the
Antidiscrimination Question.8 Here, I address the theoretical axis,
namely the rhetorical tactics being used by the Religious Right in
its attempt to achieve what Professor Reva Siegel calls
“preservation-through-transformation”—a dynamic through which
a group that opposes civil rights reform modernizes its rhetoric after
a civil rights victory in an attempt to maintain unequal status
regimes.9 The Religious Right is employing two rhetorical tactics in
its attempt to maintain a status regime in which LGBT people are
second-class citizens—one descriptive and one legal.10 Notably,
these maneuvers are not the primary arguments made by the
Religious Right. Rather, the dynamic is working at a more nuanced

Focus on the Family, the Alliance Defending Freedom, the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, the Liberty Counsel, the Freedom of Conscience Defense Fund, American
Center for Law and Justice, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, the
Family Research Council, Concerned Women for America, the Faith & Freedom
Coalition, the Council for National Policy, and the Liberty Institute. See generally
FREDERICK CLARKSON, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCS., WHEN EXEMPTION IS THE
RULE: THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM STRATEGY OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 10–12 (Jan.
2016),
http://www.politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/WhenExemption-is-the-Rule-PRA-Report.pdf.
6. See id. (discussing the general strategy of the Religious Right in framing its
policy goals in an attempt to permit exemption from antidiscrimination laws on
facially permissible bases).
7. See Kyle C. Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires with the First Amendment:
Religious Freedom, the Anti-LGBT Right, and Interest Convergence Theory, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2017).
8. See id.; see also Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3 (discussing the role of the
feminist movement in reforming marriage laws and the continuation of status
difference in the legal system).
9. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178 (1996); see also Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124
YALE L.J. 2516, 2552 (2015).
10. See Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3, at 8–9.
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level, subordinate to the primary legal argument that the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses render
application of antidiscrimination law unconstitutional.11 Because
these maneuvers are embedded within and subordinate to the
primary arguments, it is important to expose them so that LGBTrights advocates can expressly argue against them and the Court
can have the opportunity to expressly address them and break the
preservation-through-transformation dynamic.
The descriptive tactic is a revamped narrative about the place
and perception of the Religious Right in American law and culture.
Where the Religious Right once used an attacking narrative that
vilified and pathologized LGBT people to achieve its goal of
perpetuating status hierarchies, today it has modernized the
narrative. It invokes a victimhood narrative rather than an
attacking one.12 It contends that enforcing antidiscrimination laws
to require Christian business owners to provide goods and services
for a same-sex wedding is discrimination against the Religious
Right.13
The Religious Right uses this descriptive tactic as a
springboard to make its secondary and subordinate legal argument,
the “status-conduct argument.” This argument insists that what
LGBT people label as prohibited “discrimination”—denying samesex wedding-related goods and services—is not discrimination
based on sexual orientation (status).14 Rather, the refusal is a
rejection of conduct—the act of marrying.15 Thus, the argument
concludes, there is no status-based (sexual orientation)
discrimination, which is the only type of discrimination which
antidiscrimination laws prohibit.16 As a result, these businesses
should be free to refuse same-sex wedding goods and services.
At first blush, this descriptive and legal rhetoric might appear
to be new and sui generis in the wake of Obergefell. However, closer
examination of the status-conduct argument reveals it is merely an
11. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Comm’n at 14–16, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762, at
*14–16.
12. See Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3, at 8–9.
13. I have previously addressed this narrative shift in greater detail. See id.;
Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires, supra note 7, at 1129–1139.
14. As used throughout this article, “status” is intended to signify the concept of
sexual orientation as an identity—heterosexual, gay, lesbian, or bisexual.
15. See generally, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2516
(describing the burgeoning requests for religious exemptions as “complicity-based
conscience claims” and noting that such claims “focus on the conduct of others outside
the faith community”).
16. See infra Part I(d).
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old trope in new clothing. The status-conduct argument was
successfully used for many decades to justify status hierarchies in
which LGBT people were subordinated. It was the primary basis of
court decisions in the 1970s through the mid-2000s when LGBTrights activists challenged sodomy laws.17 Often, courts relied on
the status-conduct distinction to uphold such laws, reasoning that
states could prohibit conduct;18 these decisions failed to consider the
inextricable connection between (outlawed) same-sex intimate
conduct and the status (identity) of being lesbian or gay.
By looking behind the surface-level First Amendment
arguments and deconstructing the Religious Right’s subordinate
arguments, this essay demonstrates what is at stake in Masterpiece,
namely an attempt to secure the preservation of status regimes in
the face of civil rights victories through the transformation and
modernization of the rhetoric utilized by the Religious Right.19 The
Court should carefully consider the Religious Right’s subordinate
arguments and soundly reject them—based on its own precedent,
which has addressed and rejected the status-conduct argument,
based on accepted notions about what constitutes identity, and
because it is an important opportunity to expose and break the
preservation-through-transformation dynamic that works to deny
LGBT Americans formal equality. The Religious Right should not
get a second bite at the status-conduct apple simply by dressing it
up as an orange. To allow the resuscitation of an old, factually
incorrect, and legally untenable position would undermine the
legitimacy of the Court and its LGBT-rights precedent and harm
LGBT Americans.

17. See Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires, supra note 7, at 1131–1132, for a
discussion of Religious Right opposition to the repeal of sodomy laws by citing
conduct such as bestiality and the seduction of children as comparable actions.
18. See id. at 1138 n.166 (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent holdings on the
status-conduct distinction).
19. See Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2119; NeJaime & Siegel,
Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2553 (noting that “religious actors can shift from
speaking as a majority seeking to enforce traditional morality to speaking as a
minority seeking exemptions from laws that offend traditional morality” and
observing that when opponents of marriage equality “can no longer persuade by
appeal to shared beliefs about the wrongs of same-sex relationships, they may
instead appeal to beliefs about the importance of protecting religious pluralism,
revising the secular rationale for the claim in a way that gives more direct and
uninhibited expression to its religious logic.”).
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What’s Old Is New Again: The Status-Conduct Argument
in LGBT Civil Rights Litigation

The Religious Right has employed various arguments and
narratives throughout its long anti-equality history.20 Tracing its
trajectory reveals the rhetoric and argument moving from (1) an
anti-equality agenda based on outright moral disapproval of
homosexuality, to (2) one that was based on an alleged distinction
between the status of being LGBT and the conduct associated with
it, but still cloaked in moral disapproval, to (3) one that no longer
emphasized the status-conduct distinction but instead made an
argument about protecting children, to (4) the present-day
resurrection of a modernized status-conduct argument, this time
with less emphasis on moral disapproval and more focus on
characterizing Christian business owners as tolerant of LGBT
people and seeking merely to decline participating in conduct—the
act of same-sex marriage.
Each era builds upon the one before it. As LGBT equality
made gains, the next era’s argument opposing that equality took a
different form designed to absorb the gains and freeze them where
they were. This is Siegel’s preservation-through-transformation
dynamic in action.21 This dynamic is particularly notable in the
Antidiscrimination Question cases, where we can trace a direct line
from the status-conduct arguments of forty years ago to the
modernized version of that argument in Masterpiece.22
a. The Early Years (1950s Through 1970s): Expressly
Homophobic Rhetoric, Expressly Homophobic Laws
As I have described in detail elsewhere,23 the 1950s through
the 1970s saw a virulently homophobic narrative emanating from
the Religious Right.24 It was an attacking narrative, grounded in
Christianity, that characterized “homosexuals”25 as prone to

20. The history of LGBT rights in American law and the history of LGBT
organizing in American society is long and rich, stretching back to the 1900s.
Professor Patricia Cain has provided a comprehensive summary of this history up to
1993. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History,
79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993). The intentionally narrow focus of this essay on just one
small piece of that history is not meant to diminish the victories won along the way
or minimize the sting of the other defeats suffered by the LGBT community.
21. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9; NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars,
supra note 9, at 2552.
22. See Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3.
23. See Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires, supra note 7, at 1129–1132.
24. Id.
25. “Homosexual” is a label “aggressively used by anti-gay extremists to suggest
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pedophilia, sick, and child molesters.26 Public policy, laws, and
regulations tracked this derogatory rhetoric. For example, in the
1950s, the federal government fired five thousand government
employees that it suspected or knew were LGBT.27 In response to
this “Lavender Scare,” Congress issued a report with language
mirroring the Religious Right’s rhetoric: it asserted that LGBT
people “engage in overt acts of perversion” and “lack the emotional
stability of normal persons.”28 The executive branch followed suit:
in 1953, President Eisenhower issued an executive order banning
LGBT people from federal employment, as well as from employment
with federal government contractors because LGBT people—along
with alcoholics and neurotics—presented a security risk.29 The
American Psychiatric Association fell in line with the Religious
Right, Congress, and the President when in 1952 it included
homosexuality as a “sociopathic personality disturbance” in the
first-ever version of its diagnostic handbook, the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM).30
Notwithstanding these hateful and discriminatory actions by
the public and private sectors alike, or perhaps because of them, the
modern-day LGBT-rights movement emerged as the 1950s became
the 1960s. The riots at the Stonewall Inn sparked the modern
LGBT rights movement.31 In response, the Religious Right
that gay people are somehow diseased or psychologically/emotionally disordered.”
GLAAD Media Reference Guide–Terms to Avoid, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/
reference/offensive (last accessed Nov. 21, 2017). Most LGBT people and their allies
prefer the term “same-sex” or “LGBT.” See id.
26. DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT 47–48, 76–78 (1997).
27. See Susan Donaldson James, Lavender Scare: U.S. Fired 5,000 Gays in 1953
‘Witch Hunt’, ABC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/lavenderscare-us-fired-thousands-gays-infamous-chapter/story?id=15848947.
28. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATION, S. COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXEC.
DEP’TS, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT,
INTERIM REPORT, 81st Cong., S. Doc. No. 241, at 2, 4 (1950), reprinted in Employment
of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government (1950), FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/assault/context/employment.html
(last accessed Nov. 21, 2017).
29. See A History of Gay Rights in America, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/
pictures/a-history-of-gay-rights-in-america/6/ (last accessed Nov. 21, 2017).
30. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL
DISORDERS 38–39 (1952), http://www.turkpsikiyatri.org/arsiv/dsm-1952.pdf. The
APA did not remove this language until 1973. See Panelists Recount Events Leading
to Deleting Homosexuality as a Psychiatric Disorder from DSM, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS,
http://www.psychiatricnews.org/pnews/98-07-17/dsm.html (last accessed Nov. 22,
2017).
31. See This Day in History: 1969 The Stonewall Riot, HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-hiatory/the-stonewall-riot (last accessed Nov. 7,
2017); see also Jasmine Foo, “In Sickness and in Health, Until Death Do Us Part”:
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redoubled its efforts to demonize LGBT Americans. For example,
the 1960s saw the Religious Right repeatedly link the LGBT rights
movement with a propensity to commit sexual crimes;32 it suggested
that the movement planned to place LGBT teachers in schools to
sexually molest or force their “lifestyle” on schoolchildren.33
As the 1960s faded into the 1970s, the Religious Right became
a potent political force.34 Anita Bryant, a national celebrity,
launched a campaign to repeal an antidiscrimination ordinance in
Dade County, Florida, that prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination.35 A cornerstone of her “Save Our Children”
campaign was an expressly homophobic claim that homosexuals
intended to recruit children into a gay life and then molest them.36
The campaign succeeded and reached beyond Dade County: two
days after the vote repealing the county ordinance, Florida’s
governor signed a law banning adoption by LGBT people.37
Notably, the Religious Right’s rhetoric in this era did not focus
on the status-conduct argument.
Rather, anti-LGBT laws,
regulations, and court decisions were grounded in an
understanding of homosexuality as immoral, deviant, and
unhealthy.38 These anti-LGBT laws were buttressed by the fact
that sodomy was a crime in all fifty states through the 1950s.39
An Examination of FMLA Rights for Same-Sex Spouses and a Case Note on
Obergefell v. Hodges, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 638, 642 (2016).
32. See Southern Poverty Law Center, History of the Anti-Gay Movement Since
1977, INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2005, at 117, https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2005/history-anti-gay-movement-1977 (noting that “gay
people commit more serial murders, molest more children, and intentionally spread
diseases.”).
33. HERMAN, supra note 26, at 48, 50. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra
note 32 (noting California State Sen. John Briggs stated: “One third of San Francisco
teachers are homosexual,” and “I assume most of them are seducing young boys in
toilets.”).
34. See HERMAN, supra note 26, at 50.
35. See Anita Bryant and the Save Our Children Campaign, GAY HISTORY (Aug.
13, 2009, 9:44 AM), http://gayhistory4u.blogspot.com/2009/08/religious-right-hasbeen-on-attack.html.
36. Id.
37. Rebecca M. Solokar, Gay and Lesbian Parenting in Florida: Family Creation
Around the Law, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 473, 477–78 (2009). See generally FLA. STAT.
§ 63.042(3) (2006) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that
person is a homosexual.”), invalidated by Florida Dep’t of Children & Families v.
X.X.G. (In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G.), 45 So. 3d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010).
38. See Williams Institute, Chapter 5: The Legacy of State Laws, Policies, and
Practices, 1945–Present, at 5-12–13, http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/5_History.pdf (last accessed Nov. 15, 2017).
39. See Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy that Led to the
Lawrence Decision, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-
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The criminalization of homosexuality through sodomy laws
worked in tandem with the Religious Right’s homophobic rhetoric
to stymie efforts to secure LGBT civil rights in areas such as
employment and public accommodations.40 The criminalization of
sodomy bolstered the narrative that LGBT people were
pathological, deviant, and criminals.
b. The Middle Years (1980 Through 1992): Sodomy Is
Conduct Separate from Status
By the 1980s, several states had repealed their sodomy laws.41
In 1986, the Court handed the LGBT community a devastating loss
when it upheld Georgia’s sodomy law as a constitutional exercise of
legislative power in Bowers v. Hardwick.42
The merits and amici briefs in Bowers highlight the emergence
of the status-conduct argument.43 That argument, coupled with
morality arguments, was the primary argument in the Religious
Right’s anti-equality campaign.44 The State and its amici insisted
that the conduct—“homosexual sodomy”—was the only issue,45 and
turned to morality as defined by Judeo-Christian values to resolve
that issue, resulting in an erasure of LGBT identity (status). The
merits brief argued that the court of appeals, which struck down the
statute, took an “activity which for hundreds of years, if not
thousands, has been uniformly condemned as immoral, and labeled
that activity as a fundamental liberty protected by the
Constitution.”46
Various amici reiterated the status-conduct argument. One
framed the issue as whether “the practice of sodomy play[s] the
same or a similar role to that served by monogamous marriage and
family life.”47 Another concluded that the right sought by Michael
history-and-strategy-led-lawrence-decision (last accessed Nov. 30, 2017).
40. See Williams Institute, supra note 38, at 5-2.
41. See Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws, supra note 39.
42. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
43. While there is pre-Bowers precedent that utilizes the status-conduct
distinction, I focus on Bowers because it was the first U.S. Supreme Court case on
this issue and thus had national impact that was felt for many years. See, e.g., Cain
supra note 20, at 1568–1572 (reviewing pre-Bowers cases utilizing the statusconduct divide).
44. See Cain, supra note 20, at 1566.
45. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85140), 1985 WL 667939.
46. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
47. Brief for the Rutherford Inst. and the Rutherford Insts. of Alabama et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 12–13, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (No. 85-140), 1985 WL 667943 (emphasis added).
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Hardwick—which it described solely in terms of conduct—was
“flatly contrary to centuries of Anglo-American tradition”48 and “an
activity which has been traditionally condemned rather than
considered a foundation of our society.”49
Bowers adopted a rhetorical tone consistent with the briefs. It
separated conduct from status in framing the issue: “whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of
the many States that still make such conduct illegal.”50 It imbued
its conduct-based analysis with morality, religion, and tradition,
holding that no characterization of the right to privacy “would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy.”51
Bowers had devastating consequences for LGBT people for the
seventeen years that it remained binding precedent. Despite being
a criminal law case, it was used in numerous civil cases to deny
LGBT people protection from discrimination in housing,52
employment,53 the military,54 and parenting.55 The argument went
like this: if the state could legally criminalize the conduct of LGBT
people, it was permissible to deny them status-based protections
from discrimination in adoption, parenting, employment, and public
accommodations.56 If the state may criminalize the conduct, it had
48. Brief for the Catholic League of Religious and Civil Rights as Amicus Curiae
Supporting the Petitioner at 2, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85140), 1985 WL 667940 (emphasis added).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 192.
52. See Cain, supra note 20, at 1588 (“So long as gay men and lesbians were
presumed to engage in acts of criminal sodomy . . . landlords could argue that they
should not be forced to rent to criminals.”) (citing Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121,
1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (noting how homosexuals “suffer discrimination in housing,
employment and other areas”)).
53. See Williams Institute, supra note 38, at 5-36 (noting LGBT people were often
denied professional licenses based on the presumption that they would engage in
criminal conduct).
54. In 1993, the Pentagon’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy took effect, under which
members of the military would not be asked about their sexual orientation and would
not be discharged simply because they were gay; however, engaging in same-sex
sexual conduct would be grounds for discharge. Cain, supra note 20, at 1623 n.385.
The policy “pushe[d] the [status-conduct] dichotomy further than any court . . . .” Id.
at 1623. It was repealed in 2011. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/
us/23military.html?mcubz=3.
55. See Cain, supra note 20, at 1624–1625 (noting a case in which the court
denied a lesbian mother custody based on a presumption that she would engage in
criminal conduct).
56. See Williams Institute, supra note 38, at 5-2.
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no obligation to protect the status. Bowers thus promoted and
expedited the Religious Right’s anti-equality agenda, built on moral
disapproval of LGBT people and a status-conduct divide;57 in so
doing, it created the “bedrock of legal discrimination against gay
men and lesbians.”58
Seventeen years after it was decided, the Court overruled
Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.59 The Court struck down a Texas
statute that criminalized same-sex sodomy60 and thus closed the
book on one chapter of the LGBT civil rights movement. With the
sodomy fight concluded, the marriage equality fight took center
stage, as did a new rhetoric.
c. The Marriage Equality Years (1993 Through 2015):
Children Take Center Stage
The national marriage equality debate began in earnest in
1995, when Utah passed a law prohibiting same-sex marriage,
followed by thirty other states and Congress.61 These so-called
Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMA) defined marriage as between one
man and one woman and permitted states to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other states.62
Twelve years passed between the first state (Massachusetts)
legalizing same-sex marriage and the Court declaring it a
nationwide right in 2015.63 The Religious Right actively fought
57. Id.
58. Cain, supra note 20, at 1587.
59. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
60. Id. at 562. As discussed in more detail below, the Lawrence Court collapsed
the distinction—drawn in Bowers—between LGBT status and the conduct of samesex sodomy.
61. See Charles J. Butler, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress’s Use of
Narrative in the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 862 (1998).
62. See Samuel Yaggy, A Tale of Two Cases: Baehr v. Miike, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 10 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL’Y & ETHICS 217, 241 (2011). The Congressional debates on DOMA paralleled
the “protect the children” rhetoric that the Religious Right used in litigation. See
Butler, supra note 61, at 864. Members of Congress articulated a “responsible
procreation” justification for DOMA—because LGBT couples cannot reproduce with
each other, marriage is unnecessary. Id. at 867. Others harnessed a rhetoric about
the health and welfare of children: “[C]hildren will suffer because family will lose
its very essence” and “we know that to deliberately create motherless or fatherless
families is not in the best interest of children” and “it is far better for a child to be
raised by a mother and a father than by, say, two male homosexuals.” Id. at 873–
74.
63. See Looking Back at the Legalization of Gay Marriage in Mass., BOSTON
GLOBE (June 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/26/lookingback-legalization-gay-marriage-mass/uhCeyrSeJtWty9tSUde1PI/story.html
(last
accessed Jan. 4. 2017).
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against marriage equality, primarily through litigation.64 It
adopted a very different rhetoric than the one it used in the early
years and sodomy era. The status-conduct argument fell into
disuse, replaced by a rhetoric centered on children, though still
grounded in a narrative of morality and tradition.65
The Religious Right’s role in litigation is through non-profit
legal organizations like the Alliance Defending Freedom (“ADF”),66
Liberty Counsel,67 Advocates for Faith & Freedom,68 and the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty,69 which provide counsel for anti-LGBT
agendas.70
If not lead counsel, attorneys trained by these
organizations typically file an amicus brief in these cases.71 Their
rhetoric in marriage equality litigation illustrates the movement
away from the status-conduct argument toward an argument about
children.
For example, attorneys with the ADF and Advocates for Faith
& Freedom appeared as counsel for one of the parties in California’s
marriage equality case, In re Marriage Cases.72 Instead of focusing
on the status-conduct divide, their brief emphasized procreation
64. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage
Equality, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1235, 1308 (2010); see also Douglas NeJaime, Marriage
Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1182 (2012).
65. Butler, supra note 61, at 864.
66. The Southern Poverty Law Center has designated the ADF a “hate group”
because it has “supported the recriminalization of homosexuality in the U.S. . . .
defended state-sanctioned sterilization of trans people abroad [and] has linked
homosexuality to pedophilia . . . . ADF also works to develop ‘religious liberty’
legislation and case law that will allow the denial of goods and services to LGBT
people on the basis of religion.” See Alliance Defending Freedom, S. POVERTY LAW
CTR.,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/alliancedefending-freedom (last accessed Oct. 30, 2017); see also Sarah Posner, The Christian
Legal Army Behind ‘Masterpiece Cakeshop,’ THE NATION (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-christian-legal-army-behind-masterpiececakeshop/ (noting that the ADF “has mushroomed over the past few years into a
Christian-right powerhouse” and that, since marriage equality, the ADF “has
positioned itself at the very center of the efforts to curtail LGBTQ rights under the
guise of religious freedom.”).
67. See About Liberty Counsel, LIBERTY COUNSEL, https://www.lc.org/about (last
accessed Nov. 15, 2017).
68. See Our Mission, ADVOCATES FOR FAITH & FREEDOM, http://www.faithfreedom.com/about/our-mission/ (last accessed Nov. 21, 2017).
69. See Our Mission, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/about-us/mission (last
accessed Nov. 7, 2017).
70. See Who We Are, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://www.adflegal.org/
about-us (last accessed Nov. 7, 2017).
71. See, e.g., Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Dist. Ct. Iowa 2007) (No.
CV5968), 2007 WL 2809775.
72. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
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and child-rearing. It described the State’s interest in banning
same-sex marriage as promoting “responsible procreation” to
ensure that children conceived through heterosexual intercourse
“are raised by both of their biological parents in one household—the
optimum setting for child rearing.”73 They went further to allege
that same-sex parents are detrimental to children.74
The California Supreme Court rejected these arguments,
holding that the California Constitution required the State to
license same-sex marriages.75 Soon after, anti-LGBT activists
placed a proposition on the California ballot to amend the California
Constitution to ban same-sex marriage.76 Proposition 8 passed by
a narrow margin in 2008 and was challenged in court.77 Attorneys
from the ADF represented one of the parties in that case,
Hollingsworth.78 They again argued about the health and moral
safety of children, contending that Proposition 8 reflected that “the
best situation for a child is to be raised by a married mother and
father.”79
In United States v. Windsor, in which the Court struck down
one provision of DOMA, Liberty Counsel filed an amicus brief in
which it argued that the federal government had an interest in
“fostering the optimal environment for procreation and the rearing
of children.”80 The brief further asserted that same-sex parents
harm children, contending that if the Court struck down the
challenged DOMA provision, it would “be making a powerful
statement that our government no longer believes children deserve
mothers and fathers. In effect, it would be saying: ‘Two fathers or
two mothers are not only just as good as a mother and a father, they
are just the same.’”81
73. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 31, Proposition 22 Legal Defense and
Education Fund v. City of San Francisco, No. 503943, 2004 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1110
(No. A110651), 2005 WL 3955027 (“Every child raised in a same-sex home has been
deliberately made to be motherless or fatherless . . . . [T]here is no generally
applicable, generally accepted social science evidence that children raised by a samesex couple do as well as children raised by their own biological parents.”).
74. Id. at 31–32.
75. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 385.
76. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2658.
79. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.
12-144), 2013 WL 1143553 (internal citation omitted).
80. Brief for Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent (Merits
Brief) at 3–4, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013
WL 390994.
81. Id. at 37–38. The brief also stated, “[b]y destroying the traditional definition
of marriage, the family structure will be dramatically transformed. Many boys will
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The Manhattan Declaration82 and the Family Research
Council also filed amicus briefs, echoing the “protect the children”
narrative exemplified by the Liberty Counsel’s brief.83
The Religious Right continued its “protect the children” theme
in Obergefell. The ADF filed an amicus brief arguing that the Court
should reject same-sex marriage because married opposite-sex
parents create the “optimal” environment in which to raise
children.84
When the Kentucky marriage equality case—later
consolidated with Obergefell—was in the Sixth Circuit, the ADF
filed an amicus brief arguing that “the family structure that helps
children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a
low-conflict marriage.”85 It went on to assert that children born via
anonymous sperm donors—the method most commonly used by
lesbian couples to conceive a child—“experience profound struggles
with their origins and identities.”86 Finally, the brief asserted that
children would be harmed by being raised by same-sex couples
because “gender-differentiated parenting is important for human
development.”87 It concluded that redefining marriage as a
“genderless” institution would “pose a significant risk of negatively
affecting children and society.”88
grow up without any positive male influence in their lives to show them what it
means to be a man, and many girls will grow up without any female influence to
show them what it means to be a lady.” Id. at 38.
82. The Manhattan Declaration is a non-profit organization that seeks to “uphold
Christian values respecting life, marriage and family, and religious liberty.” Brief
for Manhattan Declaration as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent (Merits Brief)
at 1, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 390995.
83. See id. at 9, 15 (arguing marriage equality would have “predictably
deleterious consequences for children and society at large”); Brief for Family
Research Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent (Merits Brief) at 21,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 315235
(“[M]arriage exists for the primary purpose of ‘ensuring a stable legal and societal
framework in which children are procreated and raised, and providing the benefits
of dual gender parenting for the children so procreated.’”).
84. See Brief for State of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
6, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 12-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14574), 2015 WL 1534344.
85. Brief of Individual Tennessee Legislators as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants at 16, Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) (No. 14-5297),
2014 WL 2154833.
86. Id. at 17 (internal citations omitted).
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. at 25–26. Identical arguments were made by ADF attorneys in its amicus
brief in the Tennessee marriage equality case that was consolidated with Obergefell,
as well as in the Sixth Circuit in Obergefell itself. See Brief for Individual Tennessee
Legislators as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Tanco v. Haslam
135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015), (No. 14-5297), 2014 WL 2154833; Brief for Citizens for
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The Foundation for Moral Law, an organization “dedicated to
defending the unalienable right to acknowledge God as the moral
foundation of our laws,”89 filed an amicus brief in which it asserted
that “statistics . . . show that homosexual parents, as compared to
straight parents, were five times more likely to have harmed their
children through neglect, seduction, emotional distress, or
instability.”90 It contended children raised by LGBT parents were
“about 35% less likely to graduate from High School on time . . . ‘had
poorer emotional health . . . had more learning problems . . . [and
received more] therapy or special education’” than children of
heterosexual parents.91
d. Post-Marriage Equality: Marriage Is Separate from LGBT
Status
i. The Shifting Rhetoric
In the two years since Obergefell, the Religious Right has
moved the battle to a quest for exemptions from nondiscrimination
laws that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. To set up its
legal argument, it shifted both its rhetoric—positioning itself as a
victim of secularism rather than its prior posturing as a savior of
children and American morals and values92—and its legal
arguments—modernizing and retooling the status-conduct
argument. These two moves work in tandem: the Religious Right
contends that its members are the victims of secularism—
positioned as bigots and social pariahs93—and then leverages that
narrative to assert that they actually are not bigots or pariahs
because they are not discriminating based on customers’ sexual
orientation. Instead, they are simply (and permissibly) making a
choice not to approve conduct—the act of same-sex marriage.94
Community Values as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants at 4,
Obergefell v. Himes, No. 14-3057 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014), 2014 WL 1653834.
89. Brief for Foundation for Moral Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 1, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 15-562,
14-571 & 14-574), 2015 WL 1519044.
90. Id. at 25.
91. Id. at 26 (alternation in original).
92. See NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2561 (describing, in
the face of marriage equality, the narrative shift by the Religious Right “from
speaking as a majority enforcing customary morality to speaking as a minority
seeking exemptions based on religious identity”).
93. See generally id. at 2560 (noting that the Religious Right’s older moralitybased arguments against marriage equality “now sound[] illegitimate—like
‘bigotry’”).
94. For example, the ADF argued that the application of Minnesota’s
antidiscrimination law to a Christian couple who own a videography business—and
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ii. New Rhetoric, Old Trope: The Religious Right’s
Modernization of the Status-Conduct Argument in
Antidiscrimination Question Cases
The new narrative has played out across the country as parties
have litigated the Antidiscrimination Question. The pleadings
reveal a modernized status-conduct argument, one being used to
justify religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws and thus
preserves an anti-LGBT status regime. Masterpiece gives the Court
its first opportunity to weigh in on the Antidiscrimination Question,
and the briefs in it illustrate the subordinate use of the statusconduct argument to bolster the primary, First Amendment,
arguments.
In its merits brief, the ADF asserts that its client, Jack
Phillips, refused to make a wedding cake for a gay wedding
“‘because of’ [his] opposition to same-sex marriage, not because of
[his] opposition to their sexual orientation.”95 It argues that
“Phillips did not categorically refuse to serve Craig and Mullins; he
only declined to create a custom wedding cake that would celebrate
their marriage.”96
Amici in Masterpiece follow suit. Amicus Liberty Counsel
argues that “Mr. Phillips declined to prepare a wedding cake . . . not
because of [Craig and Mullins’] sexual orientation, but because of
his religious beliefs that provide that marriage is only the union of
one man and one woman.”97 Amicus Christian Business Owners
Supporting Religious Freedom asserted: “Petitioners do not, and
have never, wished to discriminate against Respondents based on
their sexual orientation.”98 Amicus Indiana Family Institute
contends that “[w]hat is at issue in same-sex marriage is conduct,
who do not want to provide services for same-sex weddings—would “deny [their] selfidentity, dignity, liberty, intimate personal choices, and personhood” and would
“strip[] them of their of [sic.] dignity, stigmatize[] their very identity as social
pariah[s], and punish[] them.” Complaint at 15, Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey
No. 0:16-CV-04094 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2016), 2016 WL 7157607; see also NeJaime &
Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2560 (noting that in the marriage equality
context, the Religious Right “draw[s] on concepts of complicity to seek exemptions
for those who object to facilitating or sanctioning another’s sinful conduct”)
(emphasis added).
95. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (S. Ct. filed Aug. 31, 2017), 2017 WL 3913762.
96. Id. at 52–53.
97. Brief for Liberty Counsel as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 31,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (S. Ct. filed
Sept. 7, 2017), 2017 WL 4005663.
98. Brief for Christian Business Owners as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 21, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (S.
Ct. filed Sept. 7, 2017), 2017 WL 4005666.

82

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 36: 67

yet the lower court decided that . . . refusing expressive services for
a same-sex wedding is discrimination based on sexual orientation
status,”99 and “though this Court has found a right to engage in
same-sex marriage, refusal to participate is not discrimination
based on sexual orientation.”100 In an amicus brief, the Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty argued that “Phillips’ objection was to
participating in and facilitating a wedding ceremony, as opposed to
any concern about sexual orientation.”101
Masterpiece is just the latest of many cases in which the ADF
resurrects a modernized status-conduct argument to achieve
preservation-through-transformation.102
As further explained below, the Religious Right is attempting
to leverage the preservation-through-transformation dynamic:
preserving a measure of status hierarchy by transforming its
rhetoric to one that is presented as devoid of bias and homophobia
99. Brief for Indiana Family Institute, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No.
16-111 (S. Ct. filed Aug. 31, 2017), 2017 WL 3913765 (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 14.
101. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 25, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No.
16-111 (S. Ct. filed Sept. 7, 2017), 2017 WL 4004526.
102. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013)
(stating the views of a Christian photographer were that refusal to photograph a
same-sex wedding was not sexual orientation discrimination but rather a declination
to send a message about the act of same-sex marriage); Washington v. Arlene’s
Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (stating that a Christian florist refused to
sell flowers for a same-sex wedding because of religious beliefs about marriage,
rather than sexual orientation); Complaint at 8, Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of
Phoenix, CV 2016-052251 (Ariz. Super. Ct. May 12, 2016) (illustrating arguments by
Christian businesswomen that refusal of services for same-sex weddings is not
sexual orientation discrimination but rather a declination to support the act of
marriage); Respondent Hands On Originals’ Verified Statement of Position at 8–9,
Baker v. Hands on Originals, Inc., Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights
Comm’n, HRC # 03-12-3135 (Apr. 19, 2012) (stating the views of a Christian business
owner who argued refusal to print Gay Pride shirts was not “because of the
prospective customer’s sexual orientation” but rather a rejection of the message that
LGBT people should be “‘proud’ about engaging in homosexual behavior or same-sex
relationships”); Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey, No. 16-4094 (JRT/LIB) (D. Minn.
Dec. 6, 2016), 2017 WL 4179899 (showcasing arguments by Christian videographers
that denial of services for a same-sex wedding is not discrimination based on sexual
orientation); Brief for Petitioner, Klein v. Oregon Bureau Of Labor and Industries,
Nos. 44-14, 45-14 (Or. Ct. App Jul. 17, 2017), 2016 WL 8465675 (detailing a baker’s
argument that refusal to make a cake for a same-sex wedding was not based on
sexual orientation but on the baker’s religious beliefs about same-sex weddings);
Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equality and Religious and Expressive
Freedom as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6, Washington v. Arlene’s
Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 91615-2) (“She is happy to serve gay and
lesbian customers . . . . She is simply religiously opposed to participating in a samesex marriage by providing one particular kind of service namely, designing and
creating flower arrangements to celebrate a same-sex wedding.”).
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and instead grounded in protecting Christian business owners
through the revered principles of the First Amendment.
II. Siegel’s Preservation-Through-Transformation
Framework
The foregoing overview of the Religious Right’s decades-long
shifting rhetoric demonstrates that Masterpiece is merely the next
step in an attempt to maintain a status hierarchy. This Section
places the historical overview into a theoretical frame, namely
Siegel’s preservation-through-transformation frame.
a. Preservation-Through-Transformation and the Dynamism
of Status Regimes
Status regimes are dynamic, not static.103 Even after a civil
rights victory as significant as marriage equality, the status of
LGBT people and couples can—and will—continue to be contested,
both normatively and legally. Interrogating the narrative of this
contestation reveals that it is merely a modern expression of a
historical inequity. Siegel posits that while civil rights efforts do in
fact create some status changes, the extent of such change is
limited.104 Backlash to the victory, embodied in a deformalized and
modernized narrative, works to maintain status hierarchies:
“When the legitimacy of a status regime is successfully contested,
lawmakers and jurists will both cede and defend status privileges—
gradually relinquishing the original rules and justificatory rhetoric
of the contested regime and finding new rules and reasons to protect
such status privileges as they choose to defend.”105 As a result, civil
rights victories work to “breathe new life into a body of status law,
by pressuring legal elites to translate it into a more contemporary,
and less controversial, social idiom . . . . [T]his kind of change in the
rules and rhetoric of a status regime [is] ‘preservation through
transformation’ . . . .”106
The transformation of anti-equality rhetoric results from
modernization, which comes about through “diverse political forces”
and “evolving social mores.”107 More specifically, status regimes are
modernized when “a legal system enforces social stratification by

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2175.
Id. at 2119.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2175.
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means that change over time.”108 The modernization is necessary
as a response to “civil rights agitation”—protest that causes the
legitimacy of a status regime to be questioned and puts pressure on
legislators and “other legal elites” to give up status privileges.109 In
the course of relinquishing some status privileges, these “legal
elites” will also defend them, but will need to find new reasons to do
so.110 The dynamic of “ceding and defending status privileges will
result in changes in the constitutive rules of the regime and in its
justificatory rhetoric.”111 Thus, “over time, status relationships will
be translated from an older, socially contested idiom into a newer,
more socially acceptable idiom.”112 Put simply, a status regime
“chang[es] shape as it is contested.”113
Those seeking to reconstitute the now-discredited status
regime must “reform the contested body of law sufficiently so that
the regime that emerges from reform can be differentiated from its
contested predecessor.”114 Moreover, for the emerging status
regime to restore its legitimacy, it must distribute social goods in
ways that differentiate it from the previously-contested regime.115
This is the dynamic of preservation-through-transformation.116
Siegel suggests that the modernization of status hierarchies is
the price we must pay for civil rights victories.117 Below, I urge the
108. Id. at 2178.
109. Id. at 2179.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1280.
116. The preservation-through-transformation dynamic runs both ways. Id. at
2185. The rhetoric of a civil rights movement may be coopted by anti-equality
advocates to modernize and thus preserve status regimes. Id. In the context of race,
the Civil Rights Movement argued for colorblindness in the law; today, the rhetoric
of colorblindness has been coopted to “supply ‘legitimate,’ ‘nondiscriminatory’
reasons for opposition to affirmative action.” Id. at 2185. The cooptation of civil
rights rhetoric thus provides justification for anti-equality advocates’ opposition to
true racial equality. Id. at 2186–87 (noting anti-equality advocates “justify their
opposition in terms that can be differentiated from a naked interest in preserving
race and gender stratification”).
117. Id. at 2179 (“[C]ivil rights reform is an important engine of social change.
Yet civil rights reform does not simply abolish a status regime; in important respects,
it modernizes the rules and rhetoric through which status relations are enforced and
justified.”). It is important to note, however, that the modernization of a status
regime “may still bring about perceptible, even significant, changes in status
relations.” Id. at 2184. It is beyond dispute that the marriage equality movement,
culminating in Obergefell, brought about significant change in then-existing status
regimes. The legal rights, benefits, and obligations to which LGBT people gained
access cannot be understated, nor can the dignitary benefits of the decision for LGBT
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Court to prove Siegel wrong in the instance of the
Antidiscrimination Question by exposing and rejecting the
Religious Right’s attempt at preservation-through-transformation.
b. Masterpiece and the Evolution of Anti-LGBT Status
Regimes
Through its modernization of the status-conduct argument,
the Religious Right attempts to chip away at Obergefell and thus
maintain a status regime that marginalizes and demeans LGBT
people.118 As previously noted, the sodomy era saw the first
iteration of the status-conduct argument—as one framed in a
rhetoric of pathology, immorality, and criminality119 and wielded
assertively to justify widespread discrimination against LGBT
Americans.120 Characterizing LGBT people as criminals, predators,
and mentally ill was an accepted and normalized rhetorical position
that resulted in legal regimes that treated them as such.121
As LGBT Americans came out of the closet, organized, and
agitated, they displayed a narrative that they were law-abiding,
tax-paying, mentally healthy, family-oriented people with inherent
human worth and dignity, thus contesting the Religious Right’s
sodomy era rhetoric. This rendered the status-conduct argument,
cloaked as it was in a deeply negative rhetoric about LGBT people,
into a “controversial, social idiom”122 that could no longer survive.
In fact, it was rejected—at least in the sodomy context—in
Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court held that LGBT people “are
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.”123

people. See Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 HOUSTON L. REV.: OFF
THE RECORD 157 (2015).
118. As NeJaime and Siegel note, “social conservatives long used arguments from
traditional morality to oppose recognizing same-sex relationships. But these
arguments about lesbians and gay men now sound illegitimate—like ‘bigotry.’ In
response, advocates have changed the secular rationale for their position in ways
that give increasingly uninhibited expression to its religious logic . . . .[T]hey argue
for exemptions from laws that recognize same-sex marriage. In so doing, they shift
from speaking as a majority enforcing customary morality to speaking as a minority
seeking exemptions based on religious identity.” NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience
Wars, supra note 9, at 2559, 2561.
119. See supra Part I(b).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2119.
123. 539 U.S. 558, 578.
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After Lawrence rendered its status-conduct argument
controversial, and arguably dead, the Religious Right was forced to
rationalize its continued opposition in a rhetoric that could be
“differentiated from a naked interest in preserving”124 the antiLGBT status regime. It did so by shifting its narrative to one of
“protecting children” during the marriage equality years.125 It lost
that fight in Obergefell.
Today, the Religious Right must again modernize its
justifications for preserving a sexual orientation status regime and
do so in a way that can be “differentiated from a naked interest in
preserving”126 that stratification. Although several justifications
might suffice, “claiming fidelity to principles of equality would seem
to provide an unimpeachable reason”127 for opposing true formal
equality for LGBT people. In other words, if the modernized
rhetoric is framed within a righteous reason, one grounded in
uncontested American values and principles, it will come across not
as trying to dismantle civil rights gains but as a neutral reaction to
those gains.
In Masterpiece, the Religious Right makes a valiant attempt to
present a righteous reason to limit the reach of Obergefell: it
modernizes its rhetoric into one grounded in American values and
legal principles as revered as the principle of equality—religious
freedom and free expression.
Using these “unimpeachable
reason[s],” the Religious Right has modernized the status-conduct
argument; this is the “modern expression[] of [a] putatively
discredited doctrine.”128 This modernization of the status-conduct
rhetoric proves Siegel’s point that “[s]tatus talk is mutable, and
remarkably adaptable: it will evolve as the rule structure of a
status regime evolves.”129
In sum, by resurrecting and modernizing the status-conduct
argument in the context of “unimpeachable reason[ing],”130 the
Religious Right is attempting to operationalize the preservationthrough-transformation dynamic.131
124. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2186.
125. See supra Part I(c).
126. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2186.
127. Id. at 2187.
128. Id. at 2175, 2187.
129. Id. at 2175.
130. Id. at 2187.
131. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2565 (“With
growing acceptance of the contested conduct, appeals to religious liberty offer a more
persuasive secular ground on which to base persisting objections to the conduct. The
goal may be not only to restrict the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, but also
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III. Breaking Through the Preservation-ThroughTransformation Dynamic
In Masterpiece, the Court should reject the Religious Right’s
subordinate status-conduct argument for three reasons: (a) legal
precedent directs that outcome, (b) well-established concepts of
identity undermine the notion that it is possible to separate conduct
from sexual orientation, and (c) the necessity of breaking the
preservation-through-transformation
dynamic
to
achieve
meaningful formal equality for LGBT Americans.
a. The Doctrinal Basis for Rejecting the Status-Conduct
Distinction132
There have been seven significant LGBT-rights cases decided
by the Court since Bowers.133 Five of these—Romer, Lawrence,
Christian Legal Society (“CLS”), Windsor, and Obergefell—provide
a strong, if not dispositive, precedent to reject outright the Religious
Right’s modernized status-conduct argument.
Romer and Lawrence, considered together, reveal the Court’s
belief that LGBT status cannot be separated from LGBT conduct
when analyzing antidiscrimination laws under the Constitution. In
Romer, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution, known as Amendment 2, which repealed all local and
municipal antidiscrimination laws that prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation and prohibited the future passage of
any such laws.134 The Court held that Amendment 2 violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it was grounded in anti-LGBT
animus, as evidenced by the fact that it “identifies persons by a
single trait and then denies them protection across the board.”135

to forestall or restrict an antidiscrimination regime that includes sexual orientation.
In states with antidiscrimination laws that cover sexual orientation, religious
objections to same-sex marriage have provided a basis on which to seek the
expansion of already-existing exemptions in the laws.”).
132. For deeper discussions of this issue, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex
Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and the Law’s Social Meaning, 97 VA. L. REV.
1267 (2011); Diane S. Meier, Gender Trouble in the Law: Arguments Against the Use
of Status/Conduct Binaries in Sexual Orientation Law, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. &
SOC. JUST. 147 (2008); Bijal Shah, LGBT Identity in Immigration, 45 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 100, 139–46 (2013).
133. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013); CLS v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1995); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557 (1995).
134. 517 U.S. at 624–26.
135. Id. at 633.
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Thus, Romer held that laws which classify on the basis of sexual
orientation as a status may be unconstitutional. In Lawrence, the
Court ended the sodomy era when it declared Texas’s sodomy law
to be unconstitutional—holding that LGBT conduct is entitled to
constitutional protection because the Due Process Clause gives
LGBT people “the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government.”136 The Lawrence Court spoke
openly about the connection between criminalizing LGBT conduct
and the dignitary and legal harms to LGBT people in all spheres of
life.137 Taken together, Romer and Lawrence establish that status
and conduct cannot be disentangled when analyzing laws that
classify based on sexual orientation.138
CLS involved Hastings College of Law’s antidiscrimination
policy.139 The policy was invoked to deny the Christian Legal
Society (“CLS”) official recognition as a student group, based on
CLS’s requirement that students seeking membership adopt a
statement of faith that required any LGBT students seeking
membership to disavow their “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”140
The Court upheld the application of the antidiscrimination policy to
CLS, uniting its holdings in Romer and Lawrence to expressly
recognize that LGBT status and conduct cannot be separated when
considering
antidiscrimination
policies,
laws,
and
the
Constitution.141 CLS argued that Hastings should allow CLS to
exclude students based on the potential members’ beliefs but not
permit such exclusion based on status.142 Specifically, it asserted
that it did not exclude potential members “because of sexual
orientation, but rather ‘on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and
the belief that the conduct is not wrong.’”143 The Court rejected this
and, citing Lawrence, addressed the status-conduct argument: “Our
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct
in this context.”144

136. 539 U.S. at 578.
137. Id. at 575.
138. Max Kanin, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: How an Obscure First
Amendment Case Inadvertently and Unexpectedly Created a Significant Fourteenth
Amendment Advance for LGBT Rights Advocates, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y
& L. 1317, 1324–25 (2011).
139. CLS v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 671 (2010) (noting that the policy is formally
called its “Nondiscrimination Policy”).
140. Id. at 672.
141. Kanin, supra note 134, at 1324–1326.
142. CLS, 561 U.S. at 688.
143. Id. at 689.
144. Id.
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In Windsor, the Court acknowledged the link between LGBT
status and the conduct of marriage. Specifically, it recognized the
important social and legal connection between sexual orientation
and same-sex marriage:
Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons
of the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it can
form “but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring.” . . . For same-sex couples who wished to be married,
the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.
This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the
intimate relationship between two people, a relationship
deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal
with all other marriages.145

The Court held that DOMA’s exclusion of state same-sex
marriages from federal recognition imposed a “disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex
marriages made lawful by . . . the States” and had “the purpose and
effect of disapproval of that class”—implicitly recognizing that
LGBT status (sexual orientation) is fundamentally connected with
conduct, such as same-sex marriage, that relates to that status.146
It more explicitly wed status and conduct when it cited Lawrence
for the proposition that “DOMA undermines both the public and
private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages”
because it “tells those couples, and all the world, that their
otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition” and
“places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a
second-tier marriage.”147 Finally, the Court again tied LGBT status
to the conduct of same-sex marriage when it noted that “[t]he class
to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those
persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the
State. DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State
entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own
liberty.”148
Most recently, Obergefell made clear that the Court believes
LGBT status and conduct are so interconnected that the essence of
LGBT identity encompasses conduct.149 For example, speaking of
the sodomy era, the Court noted that for many years, LGBT
Americans could not embrace the entirety of their identity (status)

145. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (quoting Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 567).
146. Id. at 2693.
147. Id. at 2694.
148. Id. at 2695 (emphasis added).
149. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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because sodomy was criminalized.150 It noted that “[t]here is
dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choice[,]”151
suggesting that the conduct of getting married is intimately linked
to one’s autonomy as an LGBT individual (status). The Court
quoted Lawrence for the proposition that “‘[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring’” and went on to explain that Lawrence did not go far
enough: “[W]hile Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that
allows individuals to engage in intimate association without
criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there.
Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the
full promise of liberty.”152 Finally, the Court’s connection of LGBT
“personhood” to the act of marrying makes explicit the Court’s
disapproval of the status-conduct argument:
“Under the
Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their
choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”153
The majority of the lower courts that have considered the
Antidiscrimination Question have agreed that the Court’s LGBT
jurisprudence directs that sexual orientation as a status and the
conduct of marriage simply cannot be separated from each other.154
The Court should confirm these lower court holdings and expressly
reject the status-conduct argument once and for all.
b. The Social-Identity Basis for Rejecting the Status-Conduct
Distinction
In addition to legal precedent, concepts of identity also compel
the rejection of the modernized status-conduct argument. Professor
150. Id. at 2596.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2600.
153. Id. at 2602.
154. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (holding it is impossible and inappropriate “to
distinguish between an individual’s status of being homosexual and his or her
conduct in openly committing to a person of the same sex”); Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 281 (Colo. App. 2015) (“[W]hen the conduct is so closely
correlated with the status that it is engaged in exclusively or predominantly by
persons who have that particular status,” the status-conduct distinction becomes
“one without a difference.”); Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., No. NOCV2014–751 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2015), 2015 WL 9682042, at 2 (unpublished decision) (denying
employment on the basis that the individual was in a same-sex marriage constituted
sexual orientation discrimination).

2018]

(Straight Wedding) Cake

91

Douglas NeJaime argues that the Antidiscrimination Question goes
well beyond same-sex marriage, implicating a much larger sexual
orientation-based identity claim.155 He posits that the fact that
LGBT people “enact their sexual orientation through same-sex
relationships”156 spurs the Religious Right to seek exemptions from
antidiscrimination law, and same-sex marriage simply provides the
most logical vehicle through which to challenge that enactment of
identity.157 To achieve a sexual orientation antidiscrimination
regime that is meaningful and robust, he argues, we must include
a relationship-based understanding of LGBT identity.158
NeJaime contends that the essence of sexual orientation is
relational and grounded in conduct.159
Performing sexual
orientation by engaging in a relationship is a highly salient
characteristic of one’s sexual orientation.160 In his theorizing about
“covering,” Professor Kenji Yoshino posits that sexual orientation is
performative, arguing that “homosexual self-identification and
homosexual conduct are sufficiently central to gay identity that
burdening such acts is tantamount to burdening gay status.”161
When LGBT people appear single, others can avoid visualizing
the same-sex sexual conduct that largely defines that status of
being LGBT.162 Thus, conduct is constitutive of LGBT status; the
two cannot be separated without stripping LGBT status (identity)
of its core component.163 While it is true that “an individual’s sexual
interests are internal,”164 those interests are directed externally
toward another person, thus rendering sexual orientation
inherently relational;165 relationships are conduct-based.166 As
155. See NeJaime, Marriage Inequality, supra note 64, at 1176.
156. Id. at 1175.
157. Id. at 1175–76.
158. Id. at 1176.
159. Id. at 1196.
160. Id.
161. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 778 (2002).
162. Id. at 847.
163. See Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay
Political Narrative, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 60–61 (2003).
164. Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual
Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1286 (2006).
165. Id.
166. See NeJaime, Marriage Inequality, supra note 64, at 1198; see also Janet E.
Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY? NEW WORK ON THE
POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 41, 41 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000) (“[I]t takes two
women, or at least one woman and the imagination of another, to make a lesbian.”);
Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the
Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1650
(1993) (“[A]lmost definitionally, coupling or the desire to couple must figure in same-
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NeJaime observes, “[e]ntering, performing, and publicly showing a
same-sex relationship serves as a central way of embracing and
maintaining one’s lesbian or gay identity.”167
Conceptualizing LGBT identity (status) in this way
underscores the importance of collapsing the status-conduct divide
in antidiscrimination law. Accepting that LGBT status and conduct
can be separated would mean dissolving the core of what it means
to be LGBT, rendering antidiscrimination protections based only on
“status” useless.
The Court should embrace this conductconstitutive conception of LGBT status (identity) as it considers the
status-conduct arguments being asserted by the Religious Right in
Masterpiece.
c. The Court Should Seize the Opportunity to Break the
Preservation-Through-Transformation Dynamic
While the Court has solid doctrinal and identity-theory
grounds on which to reject the status-conduct arguments presented
in Masterpiece, the most important reason for it to do so is to break
the preservation-through-transformation dynamic. Disrupting this
cycle would be a breakthrough in formal equality for LGBT
Americans.
If the Court fails to expose and reject this attempt at
preservation-through-transformation, it will cooperate in
naturalizing the Religious Right’s modernized status regime as
“just and reasonable”168 by giving credence to (and placing the
imprimatur of the Court upon) the subtextual message, embodied
in the modernized status-conduct argument, that such argument is
“formally and substantively distinguishable from its contested
predecessor.”169 More specifically, the Court would be complicit in
the Religious Right’s effort to justify its modernized status regime
by accepting the notion that the justificatory social values embodied
in the current status-conduct argument are distinct from the
“orthodox, hierarchy-based norms that characterized its
predecessor”170 (sodomy and expressly homophobic law) “as a
regime of mastery.”171 If the Court does not expose and reject the
Religious Right’s modernized status-conduct argument, it will
participate in the enhancement of “the legal system’s capacity to
sex orientation.”).
167. NeJaime, Marriage Inequality, supra note 64, at 1199.
168. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2184.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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legitimate residual social inequalities among status-differentiated
groups.”172
The Court simply cannot take part in this effort to relegitimize and reestablish an anti-LGBT regime such that it is “once
again . . . justified as ‘reasonable.’”173 Doing so would allow our
legal system to continue to enforce a social stratification that it has
previously rejected,174 but by “a new regime, formally
distinguishable from its predecessor, that will protect the privileges
of heretofore dominant groups, although not necessarily to the same
degree.”175 It will be formally distinguishable because it will be
grounded in the Free Exercise and Free Speech (rather than express
animus and outright homophobia), which on their face appear
neutral and non-discriminatory and which speak to core American
values. The Court simply cannot permit the Religious Right to
harness and co-opt the First Amendment to modernize unequal
status regimes to permit discrimination against LGBT Americans.
The harm that will result would be the denial of full equality for
LGBT people and, thus, the creation of second-class citizenship for
LGBT Americans.
To hold otherwise would cast doubt on the strength and
legitimacy of the Court’s precedent. If groups that disagree with
the Court’s decision are permitted to undermine established
precedent by merely updating previously-rejected arguments, the
Court appears weak at best. At worst, the Court might appear
incompetent, inconsistent, or even hypocritical as it would be an
active participant in sustaining status hierarchies in the face of
(and in contradiction to) its own precedent.
Moreover, the Court’s express rejection of preservationthrough-transformation in Masterpiece will have a positive ripple
effect in future civil rights cases. There is a power in naming and
claiming: once the Court exposes and rejects this dynamic as an

172. Id.
173. Id. at 2180.
174. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1995).
175. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2180; see also NeJaime & Siegel,
Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2563 (“[I]t is important to recognize that
accommodating religious objections may also enable the conflict to persist in a new,
revitalized form. The claim to exemption may not be a simple claim to withdraw,
conceding a new consensus in favor of same-sex marriage while preserving space for
faith groups to maintain their religious views. Instead, . . . complicity-based
conscience claims can function as part of a long-term effort to contest society-wide
norms.”).
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equality-eroding, hierarchy-preserving mechanism, future civil
rights victories will have the potential for true transformation.
Conclusion
History’s lessons will be illustrated in their most salient and
pronounced form by recognizing recurring patterns—like the
modernization of the status-conduct argument in Masterpiece. The
Court should heed the lessons of history, the lessons of precedent,
and the reality of human identity and reject the status-conduct
argument once and for all.
Siegel notes that the judges who participate in perpetuation of
the preservation-through-transformation dynamic do not do so
consciously or with nefarious intent.176 She goes so far as to
presume that they are acting in good faith.177 As such, operation of
the preservation-through-transformation dynamic tracks the
operation of implicit bias—the phenomenon by which “people who
genuinely believe that they are behaving equitably []
unintentionally act in ways that are not.”178 Both phenomena must
be explained, revealed, contextualized, and denounced so that
courts can break the cycles of discrimination that such phenomena
cause.179
Siegel has done the work of explaining, revealing, and
denouncing the preservation-through-transformation dynamic in
both the domestic violence, race discrimination, and pre-Obergefell
marriage contexts.180 Here, I have attempted to take that
explanation, and to reveal and renounce its use in Masterpiece and
other Antidiscrimination Question cases to continue a status
regime that marginalizes LGBT people. It is now up to the Court
to seize on the opportunity to do so.

176. See Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2180.
177. Id. In contrast, neither she nor NeJaime contend that the Religious Right is
acting unintentionally or in good faith in its attempt to modernize status hierarchies,
noting that “since the era of Ronald Reagan’s election . . . a conservative, crossdenominational coalition of Christians has pursued self-consciously traditional and
conservative ends” and that “Christians mobilize across religious denominations to
enforce traditional morality in the law of abortion and marriage and to seek
conscience-based exemptions from laws that depart from traditional morality.”
NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2544, 2548.
178. Erik J. Girvan, On Using the Psychological Science of Implicit Bias to
Advance Anti-Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. CIV. R. L.J. 1, 7 (2015).
179. Id. at 12–14.
180. See Siegel, “Rule of Love”, note 9, at 2121, 2134; NeJaime & Siegel,
Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2558–2565.

